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I. INTRODUCTION 
"Out of these troubled times," President Bush told a joint session 
of Congress in September 1990, "a new world order can emerge, a 
new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of 
justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the 
nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and 
live in harmony."t 
Bush spoke against the backdrop of the military confrontation in 
the Persian Gulf. The concerted United Nations (U.N.) action, the 
opposition to aggression, he said, heralded an era in which interna-
tional conflicts could be managed, and in which aggression would no 
longer be feasible. The international community, free of the scourge 
of war, could address itself to other serious problems confronting the 
planet. It would be, Bush said, "a world where the rule of law sup-
plants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the 
shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the 
• Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University. 
1. Transcript of President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 
1990, at A20. See also Excerpts from President's News Conference on Gulf Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 1990, at A 11 (Bush stating, "as I look at the countries that are chipping in here now, 
I think we do have a chance at a new world order"). 
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strong respect the rights of the weak." Bush said that "America and 
the world must support the rule of law. And," he promised, "we 
will."2 
Bush's view of the Persian Gulf situation was not universally 
shared. Some regarded the United States' outrage over Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait as selective. They pointed to other situations in which 
the United States had condoned or perpetrated aggression. The 
United States, they said, manipulated the United Nations, taking ad-
vantage of the Soviet Union's internal weakness. From this perspec-
tive, the Persian Gulf situation bespoke not a new era of harmony but 
a continuation of United States dominance over Third World re-
sources, backed by the use or threat of military force. It was anything 
but a harbinger of a bright future. These critics also pointed to the 
United States' 1989 invasion of Panama, which was widely con-
demned as aggression, as further evidence that a new era of harmony 
was but a distant dream. 
If a new world order is to emerge, it must, as President Bush 
said, be based on the rule of law in the world community. A prerequi-
site to the emergence of a new world order is adherence to the rule of 
law by the United States, the only functioning superpower. A critical 
question, therefore, is the United States' commitment to the rule of 
law. 
This article reviews the United States' recent practices, both ex-
ecutive and congressional, to assess whether they bespeak an adher-
ence to the rule of law. The article explores two aspects of United 
States practice: the extent to which the United States works coopera-
tively through international organizations, and the frequency with 
which it resorts to use of armed force. 
II. THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
A major postulate of the new world order, as expounded by Pres-
ident Bush, is cooperation through international institutions to solve 
world problems. The Reagan Administration did not look to interna-
tional organizations as a forum in which to resolve major issues. For 
the most part, it "avoid[ ed] multilateral institutions and accountabili-
ties. " 3 To the extent that it worked through international organiza-
2. Transcript of President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 
1990, at A20. See also Excerpts from President's News Conference on Gulf Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 1990, at A 11. 
3. Bums H. Weston, Lawyers and the Search for Alternatives to Nuclear Deterrence, 54 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 451, 464 (1985). See also Bums H. Weston, The Reagan Administration Versus 
International Law, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 295 (1987). 
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tions, the Reagan Administration adopted a confrontational 
approach. This approach, said analysts, involved a "radical new the-
ory about international law and institutions, "4 and "a dramatic break 
with past administrations. "s 
In the early years of the U.N. and the Organization of American 
States (0.A.S.), the United States found most other members pre-
pared to follow its lead. With the end of colonialism in the 1960s and 
1970s, however, the voices of the formerly dispossessed peoples were 
heard. In the United Nations, emancipated colonies promoted new 
principles. Meanwhile, in the 0.A.S., the Latin states began to assert 
themselves. The Reagan Administration's adversarial approach was a 
reaction against a loss of control. 
In international organizations, the Reagan Administration 
sought less to reconcile conflicting interests than to advance its own 
agenda. Ambassador Alan L. Keyes, Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs, explained, "[ w ]e must create in 
the United Nations and in other international organizations a political 
environment that is conducive to the pursuit of well-articulated and 
carefully defined U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives."6 
That statement alone might not have been objectionable, since 
each state pursues its own objectives. The Reagan Administration, 
however, carried this approach to an extreme. Secretary of State 
George Shultz criticized prior administrations for being too concilia-
tory at the U.N. "While other[] [states] worked hard to organize and 
influence voting blocs to further their interests and promote their ide-
ologies," he complained, "the United States did not make similar ex-
ertions on behalf of our values and our ideals."7 In the U.N. General 
Assembly, the Administration's promotion of its own agenda increas-
ingly put it in a small minority when voting on resolutions. In the 
Security Council, the Administration increasingly resorted to use of 
its veto power. 
The Reagan Administration pressured states that opposed its po-
sitions. For example, the General Assembly's decolonization commit-
tee expressed doubts that Puerto Rico was self-governing and asked 
4. Thomas M. Franck & Jerome M. Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's 
Commitment to Peace Through Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A 
CROSSROADS 3 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987). 
5. Id. at 5. 
6. FY 1987 Assistance Requests for Organizations and Programs, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 
1986, at 80. 
7. The United Nations After 40 Years: Idealism and Realism, DEP'T. ST. BULL., Aug. 
1985, at 18, 20 (emphasis in original). 
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the Assembly to "examine the question of Puerto Rico. " 8 In re-
sponse, the Administration threatened to cut aid to developing states 
that appeared likely to vote in the Assembly to take up the Puerto 
Rico issue. 9 The Administration took the position that Puerto Rico 
had achieved self-determination and did not want the Assembly to 
study that question. to The Assembly succumbed to this pressure and 
voted to keep the issue off its agenda. t 1 
Resisting a strong international consensus, the Reagan Adminis-
tration opposed the United Nation's Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, probably the most important multilateral treaty of the era. 
Although the United States played a key role in negotiating the treaty 
in the 1970s, the Administration voted against its final text. 12 It op-
posed the Convention's provisions to establish an international au-
thority over mineral mining in the deep seabed, viewing these 
provisions as overly restrictive of U.S. mining companies. 13 The Ad-
ministration insisted on a view, rejected by most other states, that 
deep seabed mining was protected by the concept of freedom of the 
seas. 14 The Administration's position on the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion set back efforts to achieve universally accepted norms to regulate 
the seas. On a similar rationale, the Reagan Administration opposed 
the General Assembly's Moon Treaty, which called for international 
control of the moon's mineral resources. 1s 
The above-mentioned policy statements and positions are evi-
dence of the Reagan Administration's low regard for working in a 
8. Puerto Rico: Action by the Committee on Colonial Countries, 1981 U.N.Y.B. 1113 
(Vote: 11 - 2 - 11), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/677 (1981). 
9. Michael J. Berlin, U.S. Wins U.N. Vote on Puerto Rico, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1982, at 
Al (quoting U.S. Deputy Representative Kenneth Adelman that U.S. mission had indicated to 
states considering abstention that abstention "would be unfavorably met in bilateral relations 
and on Capitol Hill"). 
10. John Quigley, The Legality of Military Bases in Non-Self-Governing Territory: The 
Case of United States Bases in Puerto Rico, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 323, 343 - 44 (1988). 
11. See Puerto Rico: Action By the Committee on Colonial Countries, 1982 U.N.Y.B. 
1276; Michael J. Berlin, U.S. Wins U.N. Vote on Puerto Rico, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1982, at 
Al (a vote against inclusion of Puerto Rico question on Assembly agenda Sept. 24, 1982, 
carried 70 - 30 - 43); A/location of Agenda Items, U.N. GAOR, 31th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983). 
12. U.S. Votes Against Law of the Sea Treaty, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1982, at 71 (state-
ment by President Reagan on July 9, 1982). 
13. See HOUSE SUB. COMM. ON OcEANOGRAPHY, DEEP SEABED MINING, H.R. 3350 
and H.R. 4582, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 135, 191, 205, 228, 311, 345 (1977)(statements of 
corporate representatives). 
14. James L. Malone, Freedom and Opportunities: Foundation for a Dynamic Oceans 
Policy, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 76. 
15. See Elliot L. Richardson, In Pursuit of a Law of the Sea, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1980, 
at A22. 
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collaborative fashion with other states over issues of mutual concern. 
One major mechanism for international collaboration to which the 
Administration gave low priority was adjudicatory processes. 
A. International Adjudication 
If the rule of law is to prevail in the world community, states 
must resolve their disputes in accordance with internationally ac-
cepted principles. A primary mechanism for achieving this end is in-
ternational adjudication. 
The Reagan Administration limited international cooperation in 
the resolution of disputes by adjudication. The Administration, as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) later determined, committed ag-
gression against Nicaragua in the early 1980s. 16 But in 1984, when 
Nicaragua was about to sue the United States over that aggression, 
the Administration filed with the Court a new exception to the United 
States' 1946 acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. The new excep-
tion was that the United States would not submit itself to the Court's 
jurisdiction for two years, regarding "disputes with any Central 
American State or arising out of or related to events in Central 
America." 17 · Since acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction 
is based on consent, 18 the new document was intended to prevent the 
Court from hearing Nicaragua's complaint. 
After Nicaragua filed, however, the Court decided that the 
United States was bound by a clause in its 1946 acceptance that prom-
ised it would not withdraw the acceptance without giving six months 
notice. The Court found that the Administration violated that under-
taking by trying to avoid Nicaragua's suit. 19 
As an additional objection to Nicaragua's suit, the Administra-
tion argued that only the Security Council may handle ongoing mili-
tary conflict. 20 Although the conflict was ongoing, the acts of 
aggression alleged by Nicaragua had already occurred. The fact that 
the conflict continued was no obstacle to a determination of Nicara-
gua's claim. The United States' position, if accepted, would have 
16. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1984 l.C.J. 22 (Nov. 26) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case). 
17. 39 l.C.J.Y.B. 100 (1984) (letter of Secretary of State George Shultz). 
18. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, appended to U .N. CHARTER, 59 
Stat.1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
19. Nicaragua Case, supra note 16, at 419, 431 (Report of Judgements). 
20. Id. at 434 (International Court of Justice, Counter-Memorial submitted by the United 
States) [hereinafter U.S. Counter-Memorial]. See also, Isaak I. Dore, The United States, Self-
Defense and the U.N. Charter: A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Legal Reasoning, 24 
STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1987). 
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meant that an aggressor could escape judicial condemnation by con-
tinuing to commit aggression. Rejecting this position, the Court 
found Nicaragua's application admissible.21 The United States posi-
tion would have dealt a serious blow to the resolution of international 
disputes by adjudication, for it would have deprived the Court of the 
ability to hear disputes involving the most serious international issue, 
armed conflict. 
At that point the United States withdrew from the case, refusing 
to take part in further proceedings. 22 Then it withdrew entirely its 
1946 acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, 23 giving as its 
reason the Court's finding in the Nicaragua case. It called the ruling 
on admissibility a threat to U.S. security: 
For the United States to recognize that the ICJ has authority to de-
fine and adjudicate with respect to our right of self-defense, therefore, 
is effectively to surrender to that body the power to pass on our ef-
forts to guarantee the safety and security of this nation and of its 
allies.24 
Although a state using force determines that it is being invaded, 
it does not have the final word on whether its invocation of self-de-
fense was proper. "The question of the legality of self-defense loses its 
essential meaning," wrote one analyst, "if the answer is left solely to 
the judgment of the state purporting to exercise that right. "25 
Although the Security Council has competence under the Charter re-
garding breaches of the peace, 26 that competence is not exclusive of 
the jurisdiction of the Court, 27 which has accepted cases involving 
aggression. 28 
Unfortunately, the United States' tum away from the Court 
came as the U.S.S.R., which had never accepted the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction, 29 was contemplating doing so. Soviet President 
21. Nicaragua Case, supra note 16, at 435, 440, 441. 
22. United States: Statement on U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nica-
ragua in the International Court of Justice, reprinted in 24 I.L.M., 246, 248 (1985). 
23. U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 
1986, at 67 (text of Oct. 7, 1985, letter from Secretary of State George Shultz to U.N. Secretary 
General giving six months notice to terminate). 
24. Id. at 70. 
25. Oscar Schachter, Disputes Involving the Use of Force, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 223, 230 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed. 1987). 
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
27. Schachter, supra note 25, at 231. 
28. Id. at 223, 224 (discussing Corfu Channel case). 
29. Zigurds L. Zile, A Soviet Contribution to International Adjudication: Professor Krylov's 
Jurisprudential Legacy, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 364, 365, 366 (1964). 
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Mikhail Gorbachev urged that the five permanent members of the Se-
curity Council agree on common criteria under which to accept the 
Court's jurisdiction. 30 The United States did not respond to this 
initiative. 
Former U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Donald Mc-
Henry, reflecting on President Reagan's first term in office, observed 
that the administration was pursuing: 
a broad attack on the U.N. system and on the concept of U.S. partici-
pation in any institution which the United States does not dominate. 
It is an attempt to sail against the current of interdependence and a 
rejection of the idealistic notion that our long-term interests are best 
served by the rule of law and by the nurturing of institutions which 
attempt to improve relations among nations. 31 
Ambassador McHenry said that the United States was joining "the 
ranks of the lawless" and ignoring criticism, not only by traditional 
adversaries, but also by close allies. 32 
The administration's retreat on international adjudication repre-
sented a significant withdrawal from a rule of law policy by the 
United States. It reduced the range of problems that might be re-
solved through adjudication and increased the number that might 
cause serious friction. 
B. Dues in International Organizations 
If the new world order is to be based on the rule of law, states 
must work collaboratively to make international organizations func-
tion. Those organizations operate on the basis of dues contributed by 
member states. The United States, because of its economic status, is a 
major financial contributor. The past decade, however, witnessed a 
reluctance on the part of the United States to make payments, as a 
result of its objections to certain aspects of the activity of the organi-
zations. In one important instance, it withdrew from membership. 
During the 1980s, the United States had a major confrontation 
with members of the United Nations over the payment of its assessed 
dues. Both the Administration and Congress took the initiative in 
objecting to paying for U.N. programs. 
30. Mikhail Gorbachev, Rea/'nost' i garantii bezopasnogo mira [Reality and Guarantees 
of a Secure World], PRAVDA, Sept. 17, 1987, at 1. 
31 . Donald McHenry, Address given at the Annual Dinner held during the 78th Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1984 reprinted in AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 
PROC. 318, 319 (1984). 
32. Id. 
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In the early years of the U.N., when the U.S. was not seriously 
challenged, it paid its due assessments for the U.N. as a whole, and 
for its specialized agencies. In the 1970s, however, Congress began to 
balk at the assessments as Third World states increasingly opposed 
U.S. policy at the U.N.33 
In the early 1980s, for the first time the President began to take 
the lead in withholding payments to object to U.N. programs of 
which he disapproved, and Congress became more active as well. Be-
ginning in 1982, President Reagan refused to pay the United States' 
assessed expenses for the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission. 34 
In 1983, Congress called for a withholding of 25% of the United 
States' assessment for programs connected with the Committee on the 
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the 
Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, and for projects that would benefit 
either the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or the South West 
Africa People's Organization (S.W.A.P.0.).3' 
In 1985, Congress ordered a 25% withholding for funds that 
would be used for the Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial 
Discrimination, for the construction of a headquarters of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa, and for any implementation of the 
General Assembly resolution that equated Zionism with racism. 36 
These Congressionally-ordered payment reductions violated the 
33. By way of exception, it should be noted that in 1972 Congress reduced the U.S. share 
of total assessments in U.N. and specialized agencies (exceptions for the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and peacekeeping operations). 
P.L. 92 - 544, Title I, § 101, 86 Stat. 1110, amended by P.L. 94 - 141, Title II, § 203, 89 Stat. 
762. This led to a reduction of the United States assessment to 25%. See Richard W. Nelson, 
International Law and U.S. Withholding of Payments to International Organizations, 80 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 973, 978 (1986). From 1974 to 1976, Congress withheld payments to UNESCO after 
UNESCO refused to permit Israel to join its European regional group and criticized Israel for 
altering historic sites in Jerusalem. See Leo Gross, On the Degradation of the Constitutional 
Environment of the United Nations, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 573 (1983). 
34. Statement of President Ronald Reagan, 2 Pus. PAPERS 1652 (Dec. 30, 1982). See also 
Patrick J. Hynes, Note, United Nations Financing of the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commis-
sion: May the United States Withhold Payment?, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 472 (1985); Nelson, 
supra note 33, at 974. 
35. Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, § 114(a), Pub. 
L. No. 98 - 164, Title I,§ 114, 97 Stat. 1017, 1020, amended by Foreign Relations Authoriza-
tion Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99 - 93, Title I,§ 144, 99 Stat. 424 and by 
Pub. L. No. 100 - 204, Title VII, § 705, 101 Stat. 1390 (codified as 22 U.S.C. § 287(e) note). 
36. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99 -
93, Title I, § 144, 99 Stat. 405, 424 - 425 (codified as 22 U.S.C. § 287e note) (Supp. III 1985). 
See G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 83, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) 
(The Assembly had given no indication that it contemplated any expenditure of funds to im-
plement the resolution.). 
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budget provisions of the U.N. Charter.37 Every member state does 
not find every United Nations program to its liking, but a state must 
contribute to the budget as assessed. It may not pick and choose. 
After several states refused to contribute assessed monies to programs 
of which they disapproved, the ICJ ruled that U.N. member states 
must contribute for all assessed expenditures. 38 
In 1985, the United States began to withhold partial payments of 
assessments to object to U.N. budget procedures. The United States 
felt the procedures gave smaller states too great a role. Congress 
adopted the Kassebaum amendment, which called for a 20% reduc-
tion in U.S. payment of its assessments to the U.N. and its specialized 
agencies, until those organizations allowed member states to vote in 
proportion to their contributions in setting the budget. 39 
The Kassebaum amendment violated the United States' obliga-
tions to the U.N. The Charter of the U.N. and the constitutions of its 
specialized agencies do not contemplate consensus procedures to set 
budgets.40 For the United Nations, the annual budget is fixed by the 
General Assembly,41 which then determines the shares to be paid by 
each state. 42 On both the issue of adopting a budget and of allocating 
the dues obligation among member states, the Assembly operates on a 
two-thirds majority vote.43 By ratifying the United Nations Char-
ter,44 the United States agreed to these budget provisions and to make 
payments as assessed. 45 The 1985 act violated these provisions, since 
its call for voting on budget-setting in proportion to assessments was 
inconsistent with the two-thirds majority procedure.46 In 1987, in re-
sponse to the U.S. objections, the General Assembly took steps to in-
37. U.N. CHARTER, art. 19. See infra note 46. 
38. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para. 2, of the U.N. Charter) 
(adv. op.), 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 26). See also Nelson, supra note 33, at 978 - 79 (noting 
that both the State Department and Congress approved the Court's approach). 
39. Pub. L. No. 99 - 93, supra note 36, Title I, § 143. 
40. Id. at 633 (as to U.N.). 
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 17(1). 
42. U.N. CHARTER art. 17(2). Nelson, supra note 33, at 977 - 78. 
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 18(2). Nelson, supra note 33, at 974. 
44. ICJ Statute, supra note 18. 
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 19. 
46. See 131 CONG. REc. S7794 (daily ed. June 7, 1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias that 
the provision would put the United States in violation of its Charter obligations); Nelson, supra 
note 33, at 974 (noting that the U.N. budget procedure called for by the 1985 act would 
require an amendment of Charter art. 18); Thomas M. Franck, Unnecessary U.N.-Bashing 
Should Stop, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 336 (1986) ("Across-the-board unilateral cuts in the U.S. 
contribution to the United Nations are a violation of Article 17 of the UN Charter and, thus, 
of a cardinal U.S. treaty commitment."); EEC: Memorandum to the United States Concerning 
the Financial Situation of the United Nations, Mar. 14, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 482 (1986) 
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volve member states more fully in the budget process, 47 but the 
Assembly did not deviate from the Charter procedures for voting on 
the budget. 48 
By 1990, the United States was in danger of losing its vote in the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.0.).49 The U.S. arrears to-
taled nearly two years of its dues. so The arrears built up from non-
payment attributable to the Kassebaum amendment.s 1 
In 1988, the United States began a modest reversal on the U.N. 
dues issue. It resumed full payment of current United Nations dues. s2 
In 1989, it began payments on its arrears which totaled nearly $1 bil-
lion. By late 1990, it still owed $296 million. s3 In 1990, Congress 
softened its language on budget procedures, requiring the President to 
try to get the United Nations and its specialized agencies to set budg-
ets through "consensus-based decision-making procedures" that "as-
sure that sufficient attention is paid to the views of the United States 
and other member states who are major financial contributors to such 
assessed budgets. "s4 The 1990 language differed from prior language 
in that it did not require that voting on the budget be based on contri-
butions. However, the "consensus-based" procedures it contemplated 
still varied from the Charter procedures. The 1990 act also used a 
different formula for reducing the United States payment, putting the 
(stating that implementation of Kassebaum amendment would put U.S. in violation of U.N. 
Charter art. 17). 
47. G.A. Res. 41/213, 41 U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53 at 57, U.N. Doc. A/41/ 
53 (1987), incorporating recommendations made in Report of the Group of High-Level Inter-
governmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning 
of the United Nations, 41 U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/41/49 (1986). 
With regard to the Group of Experts, see Nelson, supra note 33, at 975. 
48. Elisabeth Zoller, The "Corporate Will" of the United Nations and the Rights of the 
Minority, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 610, 634 (1987). 
49. FOOD AGRIC. ORG. CoNST., 12 U.S.T. 980 (as amended 1959). 
50. Paul Lewis, U.S. and U.N. Food Agency Head fora Clash, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1990, 
at AlO. See FOOD AGRIC. ORG. CONST., supra note 49, art. 18(2) ("Each Member Nation 
undertakes to contribute annually to the Organization its share of the budget, as apportioned 
by the Conference."), art. 3(4) (providing for loss of voting right if a state is two years behind 
in dues payments). 
51. Paul Lewis, U.S. and U.N. FoodAgencyHeadfora Clash. N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1990, 
at AlO. The United States cited as an additional reason for non-payment a plan by the F.A.0. 
to consult the Palestine Liberation Organization about F.A.O. work to help Palestinian farm-
ers in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Id. 
52. Richard S. Williamson, Developments in the UN System, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 
1988, at 62, 64. 
53. John M. Goshko, U.N. Vote Authorizes Use of Force Against Iraq, WASH. POST, Nov. 
30, 1990, at Al. 
54. An Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for the Department 
of State, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 405(b), 104 Stat. 15 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter An Act to authorize appropriations]. 
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onus on the President to determine whether appropriate procepures 
were being used. It specified that the President must withhold 20% of 
the funds appropriated by Congress to the United Nations, or a spe-
cialized agency, until he determines that it used "consensus-based de-
cision-making procedures" as defined in the act. ss 
In specialized agencies, as in the United Nations itself, the 
United States used its financial clout to block programs it opposed. In 
the World Health Organization (W.H.O.),s6 the U.S. threatened to 
withhold its dues if Palestine were admitted as a member state. s7 Y as-
sir Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO, called the threat "blackmail," 
as the U.S. then contributed one fourth of W.H.O.'s budget.s8 The 
W.H.O. Director General, fearful over the loss of revenue, asked the 
PLO to withdraw its application.s9 Ultimately the W.H.0. voted to 
postpone the application, primarily because of the United States 
pressure. 60 
Such withholding would have violated the W.H.O. Constitution, 
which requires payment of dues as apportioned by W.H.0.61 Regard-
less of the merits of the Palestinian application, the admission of Pal-
estine would not have amounted to a material breach of the 
Constitution. 62 Even if it had been a breach, the withholding of such 
a large share of the W.H.O. budget would have been a disproportion-
ate response. 63 
Beyond withholding dues, the United States began to use with-
drawal as a weapon against international organizations whose polices 
55. Id., § 405(c). The President must certify to Congress that such procedures are being 
used. Id. 
56. WORLD HEALTH ORO. CONST., 14 U.N.T.S. 185, 62 Stat. 2679, T.l.A.S. No. 1808. 
57. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Health Agency Seeks Compromise on P.LO., N.Y. TIMES, May 
7, 1989, at AS; U.S. Warns WHO on Admitting PLO, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1989, at Al {state-
ment of State Dept. spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler); Adam Pertman, US Vows Cutoff in 
WHO Funds if PLO Joins, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 1989, at Al {statement of Secretary of 
State Baker of U.S. plan to end funding to W.H.O. if Palestine were admitted). Congress has 
also threatened to terminate dues payments to the United Nations if Israel is expelled. See Pub. 
L. No. 99 - 93 § 142, supra note 36. 
58. Jonathan C. Randal, PLO Defeated in Bid to Join World Health Organization, WASH. 
POST, May 13, 1989, at Al. 
59. Norman Kempster, PLO Urged to Drop Bid to U.N. Unit; U.S. Warns It Would With-
hold Money for Health Agency, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1989, at A9. 
60. Jonathan C. Randal, PLO Defeated in Bid to Join World Health Organization, WASH. 
POST, May 13, 1989, at Al; Burton Bollag, U.N. Health Agency Defers P.LO. Application to 
1990, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1989, at A3 (Vote: 83 - 47). 
61. WORLD HEALTH ORO. CONST., supra note 56, arts. 7, 56. 
62. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Admission of "Palestine" as a Member of a Specialized Agency 
and Withholding the Payment of Assessments in Response, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 218, 223 - 25 
(1990). 
63. Id. at 226 - 27. 
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it found inappropriate. It threatened to withdraw from, or suspend 
financial contributions to, specialized agencies when Arab states 
moved to expel Israel from such agencies. 64 In 1984, citing political 
issues, the Reagan Administration withdrew the United States from 
the U.N. Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESC0).6s 
The Administration said that UNESCO promoted Third World views 
directed against the West, 66 particularly on the issue of control of the 
activities of Western news media in Third World states. 67 "UNESCO 
policies," explained Gregory J. Newell, Assistant Secretary of State 
for International Organizations, "have served anti-U.S. political 
ends."68 In addition to concern over press freedom, Newell men-
tioned "collectivist" trends in UNESCO, such as its espousal of the 
New International Economic Order, whereby Third World states 
sought to re-order their economic relations with the West to compen-
sate for the profit the West gained during the colonial period. 69 
64. U.S. Warns Arabs on Postal Ouster of Israel, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1984, at A9 (Uni-
versal Postal Union, 1984; International Atomic Energy Agency, 1982; International Telecom-
munications Union, 1982; International Labor Organization, 1977). The United States 
withdrew from the l.L.O. in 1977, returning in 1980. See Leo Gross, On the Degradation of 
the Constitutional Environment of the United Nations, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 573 - 74 (1983). 
See generally, WALTER GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: AN 
AMERICAN VIEW (1981); Burton Bollag, U.N. Health Agency Defers P.L.0. Application to 
1990, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1989, at A3 (refers to a standing U.S. threat to withdraw from any 
specialized agency that admits Palestine as member). 
65. See U.S. Practice, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 427 (1984). 
66. Heather A. Wilson, The Evolving Antarctic Legal Regime: The Rights of Peoples, 83 
AM. J. INT'L L. 670 (1989) (book review). 
67. See Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Is Quitting UNESCO, Affirms Backing/or U.N., N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1983, at A4 (Alan Romberg, Dept. of State spokesperson, cited UNESCO's 
"hostility toward . . . a free press" as a principal reason for withdrawal.). See also An Act to 
authorize appropriations supra note 54, § 408(a)(2) (stating that U.S. withdrew in 1984 be-
cause of problems in UNESCO and that "chief among these problems" was "the assault on the 
free ftow of information" and "the pervasive ideological conflict fomented by the alliance be-
tween totalitarian and developing nations"). UNESCO is the principal international organiza-
tion for cultural issues, including scientific research, copyright relations, fine arts, education, 
library exchanges, and preservation of cultural and historical monuments. See U.N. E:::>UCA-
TIONAL, ScIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORG. CONST., Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275, 61 Stat. 
2495, T.l.A.S. No. 1580, 3 Bevans 1311. See generally WALTER H. C. LAVES & CHARLES A. 
THOMSON, UNESCO: PURPOSE, PROGRESS, PROSPECTS (1957). 
68. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. In Quitting UNESCO, Affirms Backing for U.N., N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1983, at Al. 
69. Id. See also Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Or-
der, May 1, 1974, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 1 at 3, U.N. 
Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 131.L.M. 715 (1974); CHARTER OF EcONOMIC RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES OF STATES, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. 
A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 l.L.M. 251 (1975). 
12
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/6
1992] New World Order and the Rule of Law 87 
The Bush Administration continued the UNESCO boycott. 70 In 
1990, however, Congress said that some of the United States' con-
cerns about UNESCO had been answered71 and asked the Secretary 
of State to work with the UNESCO leadership "to promote the; pro-
gress necessary to justify United States consideration of reentry into 
UNESCO. " 72 
The practice reflected in the United States' policy towards inter-
national organizations in the Reagan and Bush Administrations has 
been to exert strong financial pressure on them to make them act in 
ways the Administrations considered appropriate, and to withdraw 
funding or participation if the organizations did not comply. This 
approach is at odds with the establishment of a world community 
based on the rule of law. If international organizations are to function 
effectively, they must be supported by member states, even when the 
organizations undertake policies to which some member states dis-
sent. With more than one hundred states in the major international 
organizations, all policy decisions will engender dissent from some 
members. If the dissenters withhold funding, the organizations will 
not be able to carry out policy. International organizations are a key 
element of the rule of law, yet the Reagan and Bush Administrations 
have not shown a willingness to abide by majority approaches. 
C. Access to the United Nations 
If the United Nations is to function effectively, it must be able to 
invite to its proceedings the parties involved in international disputes. 
With the United Nations headquarters located in New York, this im-
poses a special obligation on the United States. 
In 1987, for the first time, the United States took action limiting 
the access of accredited delegates to the U.N. headquarters in New 
York. 73 Congress passed legislation to close the Palestine Liberation 
Organization mission at the United Nations, 74 which had granted the 
PLO observer status. 7s The General Assembly resolved that the ac-
tion would violate the United States' obligations to the U.N.76 Under 
70. Don Shannon, Next Step: U.N. Rides High After Cold War, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 
1990, at Hl. 
71. An Act to authorize appropriations, supra note 54, § 408(a). 
72. Id., § 408(b). 
73. John Quigley, Congress and the P.L.O. and Conflicts Between Statutes and Treaties, 
35 WAYNE L. REV. 83 (1988). 
74. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100 - 204, 101 Stat. 1406, 1407 (1988). 
75. U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
76. G.A. Res. 42/210B, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. (1988), reported in 22 
U.N.L. REP. 53 (1988)(Vote: 145 - 1). See also U.S. Seeks to Keep P.L.O. Office Open, N.Y. 
13
Quigley: The New World Order and the Rule of Law
Published by SURFACE, 1992
88 Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com. [Vol. 18:75 
the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the 
United Nations, the United States was not to "impose any impedi-
ments to transit to or from the headquarters district" by "persons 
invited to the headquarters district by the United Nations ... on offi-
cial business. "77 
Deciding that a dispute existed between the United States and 
the U.N. under the Headquarters Agreement, 78 the General Assembly 
asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion on whether, under an arbitra-
tion provision of the Headquarters Agreement, the United States 
must arbitrate this dispute with the U.N.79 Rather than wait for an 
answer, the U.S. Department of Justice ordered the PLO to close its 
U.N. mission in New York,80 and when it did not, filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
The ICJ ruled that the United States was obliged to arbitrate its 
dispute with the U.N. 81 The United States refused. That issue became 
moot, however, when the District Court ruled against the Justice De-
partment. The court said that the 1987 Act did not expressly state 
that it was to prevail over the Headquarters Agreement, and, there-
fore, that the Agreement took precedence. 82 After the State Depart-
ment expressed concern over the issue, the Justice Department did 
not appeal this ruling. 83 
The following year the State Department refused a visa to PLO 
Chairman Y assir Arafat, who had been invited to speak at a General 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1987, at A3. See Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Na-
tions, June 26, 1947, U.S.-U.N., 61 Stat. 3416, T.l.A.S. No. 1676 [hereinafter Headquarters 
Agreement]. 
77. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 76, art. IV § 11. 
78. G.A. Res. 42/229A (1988), reported in 22 U.N.L. REP. 62 (1988) (Vote: 143 - 1). 
79. G.A. Res. 42/229B, 42d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/42/PV.104 (1988) at 58, reported in 22 
U.N.L. REP. 62 (1988) (Vote: unanimous (Israel and U.S.A. not participating)). 
80. See Robert Pear, Washington Talk P.L.O. Told to Shut Mission in JO Days, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1988, at §§ 1 & 4 (City ed.); U.S. Reluctantly Orders PLO to Close U.N. 
Mission as New Law Requires, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1988, at A21. The Act was adopted 
Dec. 22, 1987, to take effect 90 days later. The Attorney General gave the mission notice Mar. 
11, 1988, to close by Mar. 21, 1988. See U.S. Seeks to Keep P.L.O. Office Open, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 24, 1987, at A3. 
81. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations 
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (U.N. v. U.S.A.), 19881.C.J. 12 (Apr. 26) (adv. op), 
no. 77. 
82. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 690 F. Supp. 1243, 1243 - 60 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a subse-
quent act of Congress prevails over a treaty obligation, as a matter of U.S. domestic law, only if 
the act evidences an explicit intent to override the treaty obligation). 
83. U.S. Will Allow P.L.O. to Maintain Its Office at U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, at 
Al ("It was decided, in light offoreign policy considerations, including the U.S. role as host to 
the United Nations organization, not to appeal in this instance."). 
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Assembly session in New York.84 The Department gave as its reason 
terrorist acts committed by the PL0.85 Because the PLO was accred-
ited as an observer, however, the refusal to admit Arafat violated the 
Headquarters Agreement. 86 The General Assembly moved its session 
to Geneva to hear Arafat. In 1989, Arab states asked the General 
Assembly to change the status of the PLO from an observer organiza-
tion to a non-member state, after the PLO declared statehood in 1988. 
The State Department threatened to withhold its U.N. dues if the res-
olution were adopted, and the proponents backed off. Secretary Gen-
eral Javier Perez de Cuellar said that any withholding of dues by the 
United States would violate its dues obligations under the Charter.87 
The spat over access to U.N. headquarters for the PLO and 
Arafat represented a serious violation by the United States of its obli-
gation to host the organization. The U.N. must have the ability to 
invite and receive necessary parties if it is to fulfill its mission. That 
mission is crucial if the rule of law is to prevail in the world commu-
nity. If the United States seeks to promote the rule of law, it must let 
the U.N. invite whom it chooses. 
D. U.N. Voting Records of Other States 
If international organizations are to function effectively, the 
member states must be free to voice their views. Stronger states, how-
ever, have an ability to influence weaker states. The United States, as 
a strong state, undertook a policy during the 1980s to pressure weaker 
states. 
Congress reacted to the United States' loss of control in the U.N. 
In addition to passing a law to keep the PLO away from the U.N., it 
ordered the Secretary of State to submit annual reports "with respect 
to each foreign country member of the United Nations, [and] the vot-
ing practices of the governments of such countries at the United Na-
tions."88 The reports were to "evaluate [the] General Assembly and 
Security Council actions and the responsiveness of those governments 
to United States' policy on issues of special importance to the United 
84. Robert Pear, U.S. Denies Arafat Entry for Speech to Session of U.N. , N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 1988, at Al. 
85. U.S. Dept. of State Statement on the Visa Application of Yassir Arafat, reprinted in 83 
AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 254 (1989). 
86. See Headquarters Agreement, supra note 76, art. IV. § 11. See also W. Michael Reis-
man, The Arafat Visa Affair: Exceeding the Bounds of Host State Discretion, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 
519, 527 (1989). 
87. Paul Lewis, Arabs at U.N. Relax Stand on P.LO., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1989, at A3. 
88. An Act to authorize appropriations, supra note 54, § 406(a). 
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States. "89 They were to analyze "the extent to which member coun-
tries supported United States' policy objectives at the United Na-
tions,"90 and provide a country-by-country breakdown for every 
plenary vote in the General Assembly "on issues which directly af-
fected important United States interests and on which the United 
States lobbied extensively."9t 
For U .N. plenary session votes on all issues, the reports were to 
provide "a comparison of the votes cast by each member country with 
the vote cast by the United States."92 They were also to analyze "the 
extent to which other members supported United States' policy objec-
tives in the Security Council" and give "a separate listing of all Secur-
ity Council votes of each member country in comparison with the 
United States. "93 
The Secretary of State was "to inform United States diplomatic 
missions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Coun-
cil activities. "94 The obvious, though unstated, intention was to en-
able ambassadors to pressure the host government. This practice 
compromised the spirit of free and genuine participation that is neces-
sary for the U.N. to operate as an effective institution. 
E. Panama and Iraq 
One of the most important aspects of the work of the United 
Nations is to cope with armed conflict. Yet in two situations the Bush 
Administration itself resorted to armed force, acting alone, rather 
than seeking a U.N. approach. 
The Bush Administration paid little regard to international pro-
cedure in its 1989 military action in Panama. It had urged the O.A.S. 
to pressure Gen. Manuel Noriega to resign from office as de facto 
leader of Panama, and the O.A.S. did so.9s But when this pressure 
did not produce prompt results, the United States invaded and over-
89. Id., § 406(a). 
90. Id., § 406(b)(l). 
91. Id., § 406(b)(3)(a). 
92. An Act to authorize appropriations, supra note 54, § 406 (b)(4). 
93. Id., § 406(b)(5). 
94. Id. , § 406(d). 
95. See Larry Rohter, O.A.S. Draws Latin Fire for Stand on Panama, N.Y. TIMES, June 
4, 1989, at AlO; Robert Pear, Latin Envoys Report No Progress in Their Effort to Dislodge 
Noriega, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1989, at A6; Robert Pear, Diplomats Urge Noriega to Resign by 
Sept. 1, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1989, at A6; Diplomacy: Haunting Noriega issue stirs great hope 
and low expectation as O.A.S. meets again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1989, at A20. 
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threw Gen. Noriega.96 Then the O.A.S., with the United States cast-
ing the lone negative vote, 97 "deeply deplored" the invasion and called 
on the United States to withdraw immediately, stating that with-
drawal was necessary to protect "the right of the Panamanian people 
to self-determination without outside interference."98 The U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly also condemned the invasion and demanded an imme-
diate U.S. withdrawal from Panama.99 
In the 1980s, the U.S.S.R. called for a stronger role for the Secur-
ity Council in resolving international crises. The United States did 
not respond to these proposals. President Mikhail Gorbachev sug-
gested that a U.N. mechanism be devised to monitor arms reduction 
treaties, crisis situations, and even a state's military preparations that 
seemed directed at aggression. 100 Military observers, he said, should 
be sent more frequently as observers in conflict situations. 101 When 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the U.S.S.R. proposed that the long 
dormant Military Staff Committee of the Security Council, composed 
of its five permanent members, coordinate whatever military action 
might be taken by other states against Iraq or its shipping. 102 As a 
result of its proposal, the Security Council's resolution on enforce-
ment of the commercial blockade of Iraq asked member states to co-
ordinate their vessel-searching activity through the Committee. 103 
96. Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. Troops Gain Wide Control in Panama,· New Leaders Put In, 
But Noriega Gets Away, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al. 
97. See O.A.S., American Nations Assail U.S. Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1989, at A15; 
O.A.S. Votes to Censure U.S. for Intervention, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1989, at A7. 
98. O.A.S., American Nations Assail U.S. Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1989, at A15. La 
OEA dep/ora la invasion y exige un cese de/ fuego [The O.A.S. Deplores the Invasion and 
Demands a Ceasefire], LA PRENSA (Buenos Aires), Dec. 23, 1989, at 4. 
99. G.A. Res. 44/240, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/240 (1989), reported in U.N. 
Assembly Condemns Invasion Calls/or Troop Pullout, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1989, at Al7. In 
the Security Council, a majority voted to condemn the invasion, but three permanent members 
of the Council (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) vetoed the draft resolu-
tion. U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2902d mtg., at 18 - 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2902 (1989), reported 
in Two Delegates Vying to Be the Voice of the New Government, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1989, at 
A12. 
100. Gorbachev, supra note 30. 
101. Id. 
102. See Shevardnadze and Dumas at Press Conference, TASS DISPATCH, Aug. 26, 1990; 
Paul Lewis, U.S. Seeks to Revive Panel that Enforces U.N. Decrees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1990, 
at A19 (U.S., reacting to Soviet proposal of previous week, recommends role for Military Staff 
Committee in goods interdiction program). 
103. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990). 
See Eric Pace, Confrontation in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, at Al ("To make Soviet 
agreement possible, the United States eliminated the phrase 'minimum force' and met a Soviet 
request that any military actions be coordinated 'as appropriate' through a moribund United 
Nations body, the Military Staff Committee."). 
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With Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, however, the United States pur-
sued a unilateral approach, seeking international endorsement only 
after the fact. It sent troops to Saudi Arabia without seeking U.N. 
endorsement. 104 It instituted military interdiction of Iraqi shipping 
unilaterally and then asked the Security Council to endorse that 
course of conduct. 10s Only after building up its forces in Saudi Arabia 
to a level adequate to invade Iraq did it ask the Security Council to 
endorse an invasion. 106 
The endorsement it sought and received, moreover, was not for 
the kind of U.N. action contemplated by the U.N. Charter. 107 Chap-
ter VII of the Charter calls for force organized and directed by the 
Military Staff Committee. 108 The resolution on Iraq did not mention 
the Military Staff Committee, but authorized any member state to 
take unilateral action against Iraq. 109 
The resolution authorized states to use "all necessary means" to 
get Iraq out of Kuwait. Although the resolution did not expressly 
mention the use of military force, it impliedly authorized it, but only 
if such force was "necessary," meaning that other efforts had failed. 
But economic sanctions were then in place against Iraq, and a strat-
egy of negotiation based on the pressure created by those sanctions 
held a prospect of success. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration 
avoided negotiations with Iraq over issues whose resolution might 
have led Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. 110 
The Bush Administration used military force for purposes that 
went beyond getting Iraq out of Kuwait. By the time it began a 
ground war against Iraq, the U.S.S.R. was close to an agreement with 
Iraq for its pullout from Kuwait. Since there was a reasonable pros-
104. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Sends U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to 
Confront Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al. 
105. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990). 
106. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (29 Nov. 1990). 
107. Id. 
108. U.N. CHARTER art. 46. 
109. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (29 Nov. 1990). 
110. Such issues included Iraq - Kuwait financial disputes arising out of loans Kuwait 
made to Iraq during the Iraq - Iran war, a dispute over a pool of oil under the two states' 
border, and Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf. They also included an international conference 
on the Palestinian - Israeli question. Most states in the Security Council favored such a confer-
ence in principle and advocated speedy action on it as an inducement for Iraq to leave Kuwait. 
But the U.S. administration refused to deal with that issue while Iraq occupied Kuwait. By 
threat of veto, it prevented the Council from calling for a Palestinian - Israeli peace conference 
at an early and definite date. S.C. Res. 681, U.N. SCOR, 2970th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/681 
(1990) (see appended statement of Council president indicating that the permanent members 
could not agree on an "appropriate time for such a conference"). 
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pect of Iraqi withdrawal, further force against Iraq was not a "neces-
sary means." A few days after the ground war began, the U.S.S.R. 
secured a firm commitment from Iraq to begin an immediate with-
drawal from Kuwait. 111 Yet the Administration continued operations 
several more days, for the apparent purpose of reducing Iraqi military 
capability for the future. 
In attacking Iraq, the United States did not adhere to the laws of 
war, particularly in its aerial bombardment. Under the humanitarian 
law, only military targets may be bombed. 112 The bombing in Bagh-
dad, Basra, and other cities in Iraq hit public services such as electric 
power plants, water pumping stations, and government office build-
ings. While these targets had some military significance, their pri-
mary purpose was civilian. A team from the U.N. investigated the 
damage in Iraq and concluded that life in Iraq had been reduced to a 
"pre-industrial age." 113 The bombing was largely responsible. 
The record of U.S. participation in and support for international 
organizations reflects a rejection of multilateral approaches and a 
readiness to use heavy-handed methods by the Reagan and Bush Ad-
ministration to get their way in these organizations. Even the United 
States' handling of the Persian Gulf situation in 1990-91, cited by the 
Bush Administration as an instance of multilateralism, involved pri-
marily a unilateral approach by the United States. The symbolism 
was not lost on the U.N. when Secretary of State Baker submitted 
with one hand the draft resolution to authorize military force against 
Iraq and with the other hand a partial payment on U.S. arrears. 114 
The Bush Administration has not yet shown that it is prepared to 
work with international organizations rather than to use them for its 
own purposes. It has not yet indicated that it will comply with inter-
national organizations that try to restrain it from pursuing United 
States policy objectives. If the rule of law is to prevail, the United 
111. Patrick E. Tyler, Iraq Orders Troops to Leave Kuwait But U.S. Pursues Battlefield 
Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at Al; Paul Lewis, A Diplomatic Flurry at U.N. Falls Short 
of Deal on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at A12. . 
112. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 {lnt'l Comm. 
Red Cross, 1977), art. 52 ("military objectives are limited to those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage"). See also id., art. 54 (prohibiting attack on drinking water 
installations). 
113. Excerpts from U.N. Report on Need for Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1991, at AS. 
114. John M. Goshko, U.N. Vote Authorizes Use of Force Against Iraq, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 30, 1990, at Al. 
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States, as a major power, must follow a more clearly multilateral 
approach. 
III. NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE USE OF FORCE 
The Panama and Iraq crises saw the United States using military 
force abroad. Resort to armed force is perhaps the most difficult situ-
ation for the international community to regulate in its pursuit of the 
rule of law. States may deem their interests so vital as to override 
their regard for international processes. In recent years, the United 
States has developed new rationales to justify the use of force. These 
rationales must be explored to determine whether they are compatible 
with the rule of law. 
The shift in the United States' international practice in the 1980s, 
as reflected in its participation in international organizations, was in 
part a product of the Reagan Administration's highly ideological ap-
proach to international relations. President Reagan's characterization 
of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" lent an East-West element to 
issues that had little to do with superpower politics. 
Prior post-War administrations, to be sure, had viewed the East-
W est confrontation as the overriding factor in international relations 
and had injected it in situations where it played little role. us Prior 
administrations, as they intervened militarily abroad, had typically 
either lied about what they were doing or skewed the facts to make it 
appear that they were acting within some accepted international-law 
principle. 116 But the Reagan Administration developed a theory that 
asserted the lawfulness of providing material aid to insurgencies that 
represent "democratic forces" against "totalitarian governments."117 
The accepted view is that, in a civil war, an outside state must keep 
hands off, at least if no other state has aided one of the contending 
parties. 118 
115. See, e.g., A Case Study of the Effect of International Law on Foreign Policy Decision-
making: The United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, 24 TEXAS J. INT'L 
L. 463, 477 - 78, 483 - 84 (1989)(the handling by President Lyndon Johnson of the Dominican 
Republic civil strife in 1965). 
116. See generally JOHN QUIGLEY, THE RUSES OF WAR: PRETEXT IN AMERICA'S DECI-
SIONS TO FIGHT (forthcoming 1992)(on file with author). 
117. Franck & Lehrman, supra note 4, at 3 - 4. 
118. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
1620, 1642 (1984); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 
l.L.M. 1292 (1970); Nicaragua case, supra note 16, at 109 - 10 (Merits) (aid to insurgency 
prohibited by customary law). 
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A. Military Intervention 
The Reagan Administration's willingness to resort to armed 
force was dramatically displayed in its policy towards Nicaragua. 
Opposing Nicaragua on ideological grounds, the Reagan Administra-
tion went well beyond simply aiding a contending party. It fomented 
and organized an insurgency to bring down the government of Nica-
ragua.119 It set up and financed an external opposition and directed 
its efforts. Keeping "the democratic resistance [contras] alive in Nica-
ragua," President Reagan said, was necessary to "prevent[] the Sovi-
ets from establishing a beachhead in Central America. . . . [T]hose 
who govern in Nicaragua chose to tum their country over to the So-
viet Union to be a base for communist expansion on the American 
mainland."120 The Administration set mines in the waters of Nicara-
gua's major port and attacked oil depots at that port.121 The ICJ 
found that the mining, the attacks, and the organization of an insur-
gent force constituted aggression. 122 
The Reagan Administration also encouraged neighboring states 
to oppose Nicaragua. 123 It militarized Honduras as a counterweight 
to Nicaragua.124 It set up contra training bases in Panama12s and con-
vinced Costa Rica to forego its traditional policy of not maintaining 
119. See Joel Brinkley, Rebel Asserts C.LA. Pledged Help in War Against Sandinistas, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1984, at Al (citing statement of former contra leader Edgar Chamorro); 
Edgar Chamorro, Confessions of a 'Contra', NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. S, 198S, at 18, 18 - 19. 
120. President Ronald Reagan, Iran-Contra Controversy and President's Goals, (Aug. 12, 
1987), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1987, at 4 - S (excerpts of Reagan's address to the 
nation). 
121. Nicaragua Case, supra note 16, at SO - SI. 
122. Id. at 128. 
123. BoB WOODWARD, THE VEIL: THE SECRET WARS OF THE CIA 1981-1987, 233 
(1987). 
124. See James LeMoyne, Army Games Due with Hondurans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
l 98S, at A6 (7000 Gls took part in military exercises in Honduras; use of pilotless aircraft for 
reconnaissance missions over El Salvador); Nicaragua Protests War Games, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
30, l 98S, at A3 (U.S. troop presence in Honduras "increases tension and unrest in the re-
gion"); Gerald M. Boyd, Honduras Is Told U.S. Will Defend It, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 198S, at 
AS (Reagan promises to defend Honduras "against communist aggression"); Richard Hal-
loran, G.L Training: Build a Road in Honduras, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 198S, at A4 (construc-
tion of roads, airstrips; exercises a show of force to caution Nicaragua); WOODWARD, supra 
note 123, at 312 (Honduras exercises "gunboat diplomacy to scare neighboring Nicaragua"). 
12S. See WOODWARD, supra note 123, at 229, 233; Stephen Engelberg, U.S. Aides Say 
Panama General Proposed Sabotage in Nicaragua, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1987, at Al (Admin-
istration officials said Gen. Noriega offered to undertake sabotage, possibly in Nicaragua, and 
that Adm. John Poindexter decided to run sabotage operations.); JONATHAN MARSHALL ET 
AL., THE IRAN CONNECTION: SECRET TEAMS AND COVERT OPERATIONS IN THE REAGAN 
ERA 99 (1987) (Panama channeling aid to "contras" in Costa Rica). 
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armed forces. 126 
In 1987, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and El 
Salvador called for a withdrawal of outside military aid and a negoti-
ated end to all insurgencies in the region. The Administration ig-
nored the request and continued military aid to the contras and to the 
government of El Salvador, which was involved in a major civil 
war. 127 It justified this aid as necessary to pressure Nicaragua and the 
Salvadoran insurgents to negotiate, although most other states in-
volved thought the aid prolonged the hostilities. 128 The Reagan Ad-
ministration violated a ceasefire that had been arranged between the 
contras and the Nicaraguan government by giving direct cash aid to 
the contras and by encouraging the contras to refuse to negotiate. 129 
B. Opposition to Self-Determination 
The Reagan Administration's opposition to self-determination 
was demonstrated by its policies in the Middle East, Africa and else-
where. In the Middle East, the Reagan Administration also followed 
a path that put it at odds with the rule of law. It rejected the demand 
for statehood of the Palestinian Arab people. It provided substantial 
military and economic aid to Israel, which Israel used to maintain its 
occupation of the Arab territory it occupied in 1967. That occupation 
was viewed by the U.N. Security Council as unlawful. 130 Given the 
fact that Israel used either the funds directly coming from the U.S. or 
other funds thereby available to it to maintain the unlawful occupa-
tion, the provision of this aid by the U.S. was unlawful. 131 The U.N. 
126. See Joel Brinkley, U.S. Military Advisers to Train Costa Rican Police, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 1985, at A17 (training in counter-insurgency to cope with perceived threat from Nica-
ragua); Joel Brinkley, Costa Ricans at Odds over U.S. Army Advisers, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
1985, at A16 (neutrality hard to maintain because of dependence on U.S. economic aid; some 
Costa Ricans oppose U.S. effort to militarize country; U.S. military aid to Costa Rica began in 
1981). 
127. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Envoys told to Convey Doubt Over Latin Plan, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 
18, 1987, at Al. 
128. Neil A. Lewis, Contra Aid a Key, U.S. Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1987, at 
A9; Peter Ford, Central American Peace Summit: Recriminations or Renewed Resolve?, CHRIS-
TIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 15, 1988, at 7 (International Verification and Follow-up Com-
mission of the peace plan, consisting of five Central American and eight other Latin American 
governments, plus the U.N. and 0.A.S., which reported in Jan. 1988 that "the definitive end" 
of U.S. aid to the contras "continues to be an indispensable requirement for the success of 
peace efforts"). 
129. Kenneth E. Sharpe, Did U.S., Contras Sabotage the Peace Talks?, COLUMBUS DIS-
PATCH, Aug. 7, 1988 at El. 
130. S.C. Res. 476, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 35, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 
(1980). 
131. John Quigley, United States Complicity in Israel's Violations of Palestinian Rights, 
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Security Council called on states not to provide Israel with assistance 
to establish settlements of its own citizens in the occupied territories, 
because it found such settlements illegal. 132 
The Reagan Administration also set up roadblocks to self-deter-
mination in southern Africa. It increased cooperation with the gov-
ernment of South Africa by letting it buy commodities with military 
application. 133 This violated Security Council resolutions aimed at 
pressuring South Africa to end apartheid. 134 When bills were intro-
duced in Congress to limit United States investment in South Africa, 
the Administration opposed them. 13s When Congress passed a sanc-
tions bill, it had to overcome a presidential veto to implement its 
plan. 136 The Administration continued to oppose sanctions. 137 
To justify its weak stand on self-determination, the Reagan Ad-
ministration characterized the African National Congress, the major 
opposition group, as "Soviet-armed guerrillas"138 that used "calcu-
lated terror," 139 and whose goals reflected "continuing close ties via 
the South African Communist Party to its Soviet counterpart."140 As 
in Central America, it was inserting an ideological element into an 
issue where that was at best a marginal factor. 
On the related issue of Namibia, the Administration thwarted a 
PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 95-120 (1984). See generally John Quigley, Complicity in Interna-
tional Law: A New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility, 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77 
(1986). 
132. S.C. Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 35, at 5, Res. & Dees. U.N. Doc. 
S/INF/36 (1980). 
133. Kenneth S. Zinn, US-SA: A Fusion of Interests, SOUTHERN AFRICA, Sept. 1982, at 
13. 
134. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32nd Sess., Supp. No. 32, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 
(1978), reprinted in 16 l.L.M. 1548 (1977). 
135. Jonathan Fuerbinger, House Votes Sanctions Against South Africa, N.Y. TIMES, June 
6, 1985, at Al; Jonathan Fuerbinger, Senate Approves Economic Moves Against S. Africa, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 1985, at Al; President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issues, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1985, at B8 (opposes sanctions legislation); Bernard Gwertzman & Ber-
nard Weinraub, Reagan, in Reversal, Orders Sanctions Against South Africa; Move Causes Split 
in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1985, at Al. 
136. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C.A. § 5001 (West 1990 & 
Supp. 1991), Pub. L. No. 99 - 440, 100 Stat. 1086 (Presidential veto overridden by 100 Stat. 
1116). 
137. United States Policy Options Toward South Africa, 1988: Hearings on S. 2378 before 
the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, lOOth Cong., 
1st Sess. 84 (1988)(statement of John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State). 
138. President Ronald Reagan, Ending Apartheid in South Africa, Address Before 
World Affairs Council and Foreign Policy Association (July 22, 1986), reprinted in DEP'T ST. 
BULL., Sept. 1986, at l, 4. 
139. Id. at 2. 
140. Misconceptions About U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 
1986, at 15. 
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process that could have achieved independence in the early 1980s. 
South Africa, as the administering power in Namibia since World 
War I, introduced apartheid in Namibia, in violation of its obligation 
to promote self-determination.141 The U.N. General Assembly and 
Security Council both called on South Africa to withdraw, but it re-
fused.142 In 1978, the Security Council established a process to lead 
to independence. 143 A "contact group" of five W estem states (includ-
ing the United States) negotiated with South Africa and by 1982 was 
close to an agreement for early elections in Namibia. 
In 1982, however, South Africa stated that it would not with-
draw from Namibia so long as Cuba maintained troops in Angola, 
where the Administration covertly provided material aid to the Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.), a 
South Africa-supported insurgency. 144 The Administration backed 
South Africa's linking of the issue of Cuban troops in Angola with 
that of independence for Namibia and stopped urging South Africa to 
hold the Namibia elections. 14s 
The Administration took up the issue again only in 1988, chair-
ing talks with Angola, South Africa, and Cuba. As a result, a 
ceasefire was declared, South Africa withdrew its troops from Angola 
and South Africa let Namibia hold elections that led to its indepen-
dence.146 But the Reagan Administration declared that it would con-
tinue to aid U.N.I.T.A. 147 The Bush Administration also continued 
141. For Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 
l.C.J. 57. 
142. S.C. Res. 276, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1529th mtg., Res. & Dees. at 1 - 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/INF/25 (1970). G.A. Res. 2145, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 2 - 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1966). 
143. S.C. Res. 435, U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., 2087th mtg., Res. & Dees., at 13, U.N. Doc. 
S/INF/34 (1979). 
144. Bernard Gwertzman, President Decides to Send Weapons to Angola Rebels, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1986, at Al; James Brooke, CLA. Said to Send Weapons via Zaire to Angola 
Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1987, at Al; WOODWARD, supra note 123, at 426. 
145. ISAAK I. DORE, THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND NAMIBIA 169 
(1985); Negotiations: SWAPO Denounces Western Stalling, SOUTHERN AFRICA, Oct. 1982, at 4 
- 5; Bernard Gwertzman, President Decides to Send Weapons to Angola Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 19, 1986, at A3; George Shultz, Southern Africa: Toward an American Consensus, Ad-
dress Before National Press Club (Apr. 16, 1985), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1985, at 22; 
Francis A. Boyle, Creating the State of Palestine, 4 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 15, 27 (1987 -
88)(on Administration actions that obstructed Namibia independence). 
146. Christopher S. Wren, Election in Namibia Worries Whites, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
1989, at A3. 
147. John D. Battersby, Pretoria Finishes Its Angola Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1988, 
at A3; Robert Pear, 4 Nations Agree on Cuban Pullout from Angola War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
1988, at Al. 
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that aid. 148 
By impeding self-determination in South Africa and Namibia, 
the Reagan Administration blocked the effectuation of the legal rights 
of the populations of those states. By aiding U.N.I.T.A., it unlawfully 
intervened in a civil conflict in Angola. 
If the rule of law is to prevail, the United States must take a 
stricter view of the permissible use of armed force. At the same time, 
it must support the effectuation of self-determination and must not 
interfere financially or militarily to block self-determination. 
C. Terrorism 
One aspect of international life that led to the formulation by the 
United States of new rationales for use of armed force was terrorism. 
As the cold war diminished, so too did the use of anti-communism as 
a rationale for military intervention. "Notwithstanding the alteration 
in the Soviet threat," President Bush said, "the world remains a dan-
gerous place with serious threats to important U.S. interests wholly 
unrelated to the earlier patterns of the U.S.-Soviet relationship." 149 
General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, said: 
If we are to have stability in these regions, maintain access to their 
resources, protect our citizens abroad, defend our vital installations, 
and deter conflict, we must maintain within our active force structure 
a credible military power projection capability with the flexibility to 
respond to conflict across the spectrum of violence throughout the 
globe.lSO 
General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, said that "because the 
United States is a global power with vital interests that must be pro-
tected throughout an increasingly turbulent world, we must look be-
yond the European continent and consider other threats to our 
national security."1s1 
The insertion of a military force in Saudi Arabia in 1990 showed 
that President Bush was willing to take action on this line of thinking. 
The ideology of intervention was shifting from anti-communism to 
one of maintaining the U.S. predominance in the Third World, pri-
marily to ensure access to natural resources. That ideology, like anti-
148. Michael Clough, U.S. Administration Keeps Cold War Hot in Angola, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 1990, at M2. 
149. Maureen Dowd, Backing Pentagon, Bush Says Military Can Be Cut 25% in 5 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at A13. 
150. Michael Klare, Policing the Gulf-and the World, NATION, Oct. 15, 1990, at 420. 
151. Id. at 418. 
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communism, put the United States at odds with international legality, 
which prohibits intervention to enhance a state's financial or material 
position. 152 
One aspect of the ideology of the Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions has been a strong emphasis on opposing terrorism. To the ex-
tent that actual terrorism is targeted, there is, to be sure, nothing 
objectionable. However, the two Administrations have defined terror-
ism broadly, to give themselves latitude to use force in situations in 
which it is not justifiable. 
This emphasis on terrorism grew out of President Reagan's effec-
tive political use of the Carter Administration's inability to get U.S. 
personnel out of Iran. The Reagan Administration used an anti-ter-
rorist rationale to justify actions it took on ideological grounds. 153 It 
commissioned, from the Central Intelligence Agency, a study of the 
frequency of terrorist acts. The Agency concluded that terrorist at-
tacks against United States citizens were declining. 154 Since that find-
ing did not suit the Administration's planned use of the anti-terrorism 
rationale, it asked the Agency to re-do the study using a broader defi-
nition of terrorism. The second study showed terrorist attacks against 
United States citizens to be increasing. 155 
When it invaded Grenada, the Reagan Administration's motive 
was to overthrow a government allied with Cuba. 156 President Rea-
gan gave, however, as one of several justifications, that Grenada was 
"being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and under-
mine democracy. We got there just in time," he said.1 57 The Admin-
istration also cited its supposed concern that the government of 
Grenada might take United States' citizens resident in Grenada as 
hostages. 1 ss An Administration official, referring to undisclosed doc-
152. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
153. See John Quigley, Eliminating Terrorism: A Law and Justice Approach, 3 CONN. J. 
INT'L L. 47, 53 - 55 (1987); Robert Charvin, La Doctrine Americaine de la "Souverainete 
Limitee" [The American Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty], 20 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT 
INT'L .5, 20 - 22 (1987). 
154. Francis A. Boyle, The Law Is An Ass, AFRICAN EVENTS, May-June 1986, at 51, 53. 
155. Id. 
156. Dore, supra note 20, at 12; John Quigley, The United States Invasion of Grenada: 
Stranger than Fiction, 18 INTER-AM. L. REV. 271, 316 - 17 (1987). 
157. Ronald Reagan, America's Commitment to Peace, Address to the Nation (Oct. 27, 
1983), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1983, at 1, 4. 
158. Grenada: Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 
1983, at 75 (statement of Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ambassador to United Nations). See also, State-
ment of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, id. at 80. U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: 
Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, Hearing before the Subcommittees on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House 
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uments, said: 
It is clear from these documents and other information we now have 
that serious consideration was being given to seizing Americans as 
hostages and holding them for reasons that are not entirely clear, but 
seem to involve an effort to embarrass the United States and, more 
immediately, to forestall American military action in Grenada.ts9 
The Administration did not make public these or any other docu-
ments to substantiate its claim of a possible hostage-taking. When the 
United States invaded, Grenadian officials treated United States citi-
zens courteously, even during the combat that led to their removal 
and arrest. 160 It seems probable that the Administration invented the 
specter of a hostage-taking as a pretext for its invasion. 
The Administration exploited terrorism to get support for an-
other ideologically motivated enterprise, its military operation against 
Nicaragua. In asking Congress to fund the operation, President Rea-
gan referred to "[l]inks between the Sandinistas, the PLO and Liby-
ans" and suggested that a refusal to finance the contras would make 
Nicaragua "a refuge and safe haven for terrorism" and would "result 
in the creation of another Libya on our doorstep."161 He said: 
"[g]athered in Nicaragua already are ... all the elements of interna-
tional terrorism-from the P.L.O. to Italy's Red Brigades."162 Presi-
dent Reagan did not substantiate these alleged linkages. 
The Reagan Administration invoked its efforts against terrorism 
to justify two other legally suspect military actions against ideological 
opponents. In 1985 it forcibly diverted an Egyptian aircraft over in-
ternational waters in the Mediterranean Sea, to detain persons on 
board whom it suspected of participation in the hijacking of the 
Achille Lauro cruise ship. 163 It justified the violation of international 
airspace on the grounds that the suspected hijackers, or perhaps other 
hijackers, might be planning terrorist attacks against United States' 
citizens in the future. President Reagan stated that his aim was to 
"sen[d] a message to terrorists everywhere, ... [y]ou can run but you 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1983)(remarks of Deputy Secretary of 
State Kenneth Dam). 
159. Philip Taubman, U.S. Reports Evidence of Island Hostage Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
28, 1983, at A14 (the official was identified as "senior" but was not named). 
160. See Quigley, supra note 156, at 280. 
161. Gerald Boyd, Reagan Presses Hard for Contra Aid, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1986, at A5. 
162. Transcript of the President's Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1986, at A12. 
163. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hijackers; Fighters Direct It to 
NATO Base in Italy; Gunmen Face Trial in Slaying of Hostage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1985, at 
Al. 
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can't hide." 164 The Administration did not claim to possess evidence 
of specific future attacks, and there is no reason to believe that it had 
any. 
In 1986, the Reagan Administration bombed Libya, causing 
deaths and property damage. 165 It asserted as one justification that 
Libya was likely to undertake future terrorist attacks. 166 It said that it 
had evidence about planned attacks on United States' facilities but did 
not make that evidence public.167 
Similarly, the Administration asserted a novel theory to justify 
the seizure of suspected terrorists abroad. It said that it is lawful to 
enter another state, without its consent, to capture suspected ter-
rorists.168 Under international law, however, police agents of one 
state are not permitted to operate in another state without that state's 
permission.169 Specifically, they may not do so to seize suspects. 170 
The Administration issued an instruction, however, that United 
States authorities should seize suspected terrorists in other states and 
bring them by force to the United States for trial, even if the other 
state did not give permission. It supported this instruction on a the-
ory of self-defense, citing the possibility that the suspected terrorist 
might carry out a new terrorist attack in the future.1 71 
This rationale stretched self-defense to the breaking point, how-
ever. The supposition that a person suspected of terrorism may carry 
out a future terrorist attack is hardly an "armed attack" under the 
U.N. Charter. The necessary degree of imminence is lacking, and the 
attack, presumably aimed at a citizen, is not in any event an act of 
aggression. 
164. Transcript of White House News Conference on the Hijacking, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
1985, at A6. 
165. Seymour Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, § 6, at 17. 
166. Bernard Gwertzman, Plots on Global Scale Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1986, at 
Al. 
167. Id.; Announcement by Speakes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al3. 
168. John Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights from 
Kidnapping of Suspected Terrorists, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 193 (1988). 
169. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES§ 433 (1987) (stating that "[l]aw enforcement officers of the United States" may "exer-
cise their functions in the territory of another state only with . . . the consent of the other 
state"). 
170. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277 (2d Cir. 1974) (capture without con-
sent of territorial state violates sovereignty of that state); S.C. Res. 138, 15 U.N. SCOR, 15th 
Sess., Res. & Dees., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/INF/15/Rev.1 (1960) (unconsented intrusion by Israel 
into Argentina to capture Adolf Eichmann for trial on charges of crimes against humanity 
found to be unlawful). 
171. John Walcott et al., Reagan Ruling to Let CIA Kidnap Terrorists Overseas Is Dis-
closed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1987, at 1 (quoting Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese). 
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The Reagan Administration put the terrorism label on self-deter-
mination movements, like the Palestinian Liberation Organization, 
the African National Congress in South Africa, and South West Afri-
can People's Organization in Namibia. It used that characterization 
as a basis for refusing to submit to the Senate, for its advice and con-
sent, a treaty to protect the victims of war. Protocol I to the four 
1949 Geneva humanitarian conventions expanded international pro-
tections for combatants and civilians in international armed con-
flict.172 Protocol I, which had been signed by President Carter, 
characterized as international those armed conflicts in which peoples 
fight against "colonial domination and alien occupation and against 
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination." 173 
President Reagan said that this provision promoted terrorism: "The 
repudiation of Protocol I is one additional step, at the ideological level 
so important to terrorist organizations, to deny these groups legiti-
macy as international actors."174 The State Department's Legal Ad-
viser termed the concept of self-determination a "justification for 
terrorist acts." 17s This position inaccurately equated terrorism and 
the pursuit of self-determination by military means. 
Under the banner of anti-terrorism, the Reagan Administration 
proposed action against United States citizens who supported self-de-
termination movements. It sought passage of a 1984 anti-terrorism 
bill to outlaw "logistical, mechanical, maintenance, or similar support 
services to the armed forces or any intelligence agency, or their 
agents" of a "terrorist group." 176 The State Department would have 
designated which organizations were "terrorist."177 The proposal was 
rejected by Congress, where it was criticized for the broad power it 
would give the Administration. 178 
The Administration used terrorism as a pretext to investigate 
172. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 
Dec. 12, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, 16 l.L.M. 1391 (1977). 
173. Id. , art. 1., para. 4. 
174. Ronald Reagan, Letter of Transmittal to the Senate of the United States, 81 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 910, 912 (1987). 
175. Abraham Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOR. AFF. 901, 904 (1986). 
176. H.R. 5613, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H3561 (1984); Legislation to Com-
bat International Terrorism: Hearings on H.R. 5613 Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 50-53 (1983)(statement of Willard A. DePree, Acting Under Secretary of State 
for Management)[hereinafter Legislation to Combat International Terrorism]; Leslie Gelb, Ad-
ministration Debating Antiterrorist Measures, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1984, at A6. 
177. H.R. 5613, supra note 176, ~ 2. 
178. Legislation to Combat International Terrorism, supra, note 176, at 55 - 56 (com-
ments of Rep. Dan Mica), 57 - 63 (comments of Rep. Stephen Solarz). 
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United States citizens who opposed its policy of aiding the Salvadoran 
government in its civil war. In 1981, the Federal Bureau oflnvestiga-
tion (FBI) commenced surveillance of the Committee in Support of 
the People of El Salvador (C.I.S.P.E.S.). The FBI file on the investi-
gation was headed "CISPES - International Terrorism,"179 although 
the FBI had no basis for suspecting terrorism by C.I.S.P.E.S. 180 
C.I.S.P.E.S., as the investigation disclosed, carried out only lawful ac-
tivity. Despite the lack of evidence of criminal activity, the F.B.I. 
continued the investigation for five years. 18 1 
The Justice Department also used anti-terrorism as a pretext for 
a contingency plan it devised to expel aliens of Middle East origin 
from the United States. The Investigation Division of the Depart-
ment's Immigration and Naturalization Service produced a document 
titled "Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan," that 
contemplated the possible incarceration and deportation of large 
numbers of Algerians, Libyans, Tunisians, Iranians, Jordanians, Syri-
ans, Moroccans, and Lebanese, 182 on the theory that nationals of 
these countries might be terrorists. 183 
The Justice Department's Alien Border Control Committee es-
tablished a "working group" charged with the "development of visa 
restrictions for aliens from certain countries or aliens of certain cate-
gories who are likely to be supportive of terrorist activity within the 
United States."184 Another working group was charged with carrying 
out the "expulsion from the United States of alien activists who are 
not in conformity with their immigration status and expeditious de-
portation of aliens engaged in support of terrorism." 1ss 
These plans were aimed less at terrorists than at supporters of 
self-determination movements. The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service employed a definition of "terrorism" that included the lawful 
use of force in support of self-determination. This overbroad defini-
179. Jonathan A. Bennett, Webster Lied on CISPES Spying, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 
10, 1988, at 1. 
180. Jerry Berman, FBI Spies on Central America Protesters, CIVIL LIBERTIES (American 
Civil Liberties Union), Winter 1988, at 1. 
181. Philip Shenon, F.B.L Papers Show Wide Surveillance of Reagan Critics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 1988, at Al (The F.B.I. said that its investigation was based on reports of "alleged 
criminal activity,'' but it disclosed nothing more.). 
182. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Investigation Division, Alien Terrorists and 
Undesirables: A Contingency Plan 16 (May 1986) (unpublished government document on file 
with author). 
183. See id. at 19, 24. 
184. Robert J. Walsh, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Alien Border Control Committee, at 1 (un-
published government document on file with author). 
185. Id. at 2. 
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tion was reflected in deportation proceedings it commenced against 
eight Palestinian aliens (citizens of Jordan) and one Kenyan, accusing 
them of membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine. It acknowledged that it did not have evidence of plans to com-
mit terrorist acts but alleged that the individuals had distributed 
brochures of the Popular Front. 186 These proceedings, in apparent 
conformity with the plans set in the quoted 1986 Department of Jus-
tice documents, threatened the status of resident aliens based on their 
nationality and support for self-determination movements. 
While terrorism is a phenomenon that states must confront, they 
must not use it as a basis for inventing new and spurious rationales for 
the use of armed force. Just as in the domestic context the fight 
against crime must be kept within certain limits to preserve funda-
mental values, so in the international context the fight against terror-
ism must not encroach on other important values. For the rule of law 
to succeed, the United States must confine its anti-terrorist activities 
to appropriate channels. 
D. New Approaches to the Law of Self-Defense 
The primary justification for the use of armed force against an-
other state is self-defense. States that use armed force in legally dubi-
ous circumstances typically depict their actions as defensive. Much 
controversy surrounds the definition of the outer limits of self-defense. 
If the rule of law is to prevail, self-defense must not become so large a 
category as to permit the use of force in situations in which the neces-
sity for it is not actually present. 
When called upon to justify the use of military force, the Reagan 
and Bush Administrations asserted views on the use of armed force 
that contradicted the U.N. Charter's strict prohibition. This posture 
posed a challenge to international legality, because the new positions 
asserted by the two administrations threatened to broaden permissible 
use of force to the point that the Charter would be seriously 
weakened. 
The two Administrations stretched the accepted doctrine in three 
respects: on the use of force in anticipation of force by an adversary, 
on the use of force to protect citizens, and on the permissible limits on 
the amount of force used in self-defense. 
186. Mary Thornton & Howard Kurtz, Rights Groups Question Arrest of Palestinians, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1987, at A28. See also Lena Williams, 9 Aliens' Arrests Laid to Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1987, at AlO; Editorial: McCarran-Walter Strikes Again, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 21, 1987, at A26 (the individuals denied membership in the Popular Front). 
31
Quigley: The New World Order and the Rule of Law
Published by SURFACE, 1992
106 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 18:75 
Self-defense in anticipation of an attack is a disputed doctrine, 
because the U.N. Charter requires an "armed attack" for invocation 
of self-defense. 187 Publicists who support the doctrine, and states in-
voking it, have said that the force anticipated must be imminent. 188 
The Reagan and Bush Administrations, however, routinely ignored 
the requirement of imminence in invoking self-defense. In the bomb-
ing of Libya and the invasions of Grenada and Panama, they did not 
claim that the attacks they purported to anticipate from those states 
would occur imminently. Further, the Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions argued that an attack on a United States citizen abroad, at the 
instigation of a state, was an "armed attack" against the United 
States, under the Charter. On the basis of possible future attacks on 
United States citizens the invasion of Panama was justified.189 
This position represented a dangerous expansion of permissible 
force. The U.N. Charter prohibits "force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence" of a state. 190 The General Assembly's 
definition of aggression, which lists acts constituting aggression, does 
not mention attacks against citizens. 191 A State's use of force against 
citizens of another state is not an attack on that state. It violates the 
rights of that state but is not aggression against it. 192 
In the Nicaragua litigation, the Reagan Administration ex-
panded the proportionality requirement, an accepted limitation on the 
force used in self-defense. A state acting in self-defense may use only 
such force as is necessary to repel an attack. 193 The proportionality 
rule does not limit a defending state to the use of force precisely 
equivalent to that used against it, 194 but it does discourage responsive 
force that is substantially greater. 195 
187. See U.N. CHARTER art 51; PHILIP JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 - 67 
(1948); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141 - 45 (1979). 
188. DEREK BoWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 184 - 93 (1958) (immi-
nence must be evident). 
189. 136 CONG. REC. S12 (Daily ed. Jan. 23, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy listing 
justifications put forward by the Administration on Panama and stating, "Nothing on the 
public record makes any of these justifications persuasive"). 
190. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
191. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, art. 3, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314, 
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), re-printed in 13 
l.L.M. 710, 713 - 14 (1974). 
192. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 504 · ~ 34 (1973). 
193. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 261 -
64 (1963) [hereinafter USE OF FORCE]; Schachter, supra note 118, at 1637 - 38; BowETT, 
supra note 188, at 105 (as applied to force against another state to assist endangered nationals). 
194. USE OF FORCE, supra note 193, at 264. 
195. Schachter, supra note 118, at 1637. 
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The Administration said that it was justified in using force 
against Nicaragua on the grounds that Nicaragua had carried out an 
armed attack against El Salvador by providing logistical and material 
aid to an insurgency there.196 The ICJ, however, found little evidence 
of material aid by Nicaragua to Salvadoran insurgents at the relevant 
time period and thus did not have to decide whether the United 
States' force was proportional. 197 But, even if Nicaragua had been 
aiding the Salvadoran insurgents, the United States exceeded propor-
tionality by mining Nicaragua's harbors, blowing up its major oil stor-
age depots198 and by organizing and funding the contra insurgency. 199 
In its invasion of Panama, the Bush Administration also asserted 
self-defense in a fashion that exceeded the bounds of proportionality. 
If Panama was about to attack United States citizens, as the Adminis-
tration alleged, the level of force employed by the United States was 
excessive.200 It used 24,500 troops and overthrew Panama's govem-
ment.201 United States aircraft attacking the military headquarters in 
Panama City levelled several nearby city blocks.202 The invasion re-
sulted in deaths estimated in the thousands. 203 Several thousand more 
were hospitalized for wounds. 204 
The United States' recent invocations of self-defense are not pro-
196. Nicaragua Case, supra note 16, at 117 - 24, paras. 189 - 202 (referring to U.S. 
Counter-Memorial). 
197. Id. at 86 para. 160 (merits). 
198. Id. at 50 - 51 para. 86. 
199. Id. at 53 - 63 paras. 92 - 112. 
200. Bill McAllister, U.S. Cites Self-Defense; Legal Scholars Skeptical, WASH. Pos-r, Dec. 
21, 1989, at A36 (quotes Prof. Oscar Schachter that invasion might well have violated require-
ment of proportionality); John Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, 
15 YALE J. INT'L L. 276, 296 (1990). 
201. Molly Moore & Ann Devroy, Officials Say Panama Taking More Time and Troops 
Than Expected, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1989, at A6. 
202. Brook Larmer, With the Dictator Disabled, Panama Looks to Rebuild, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 27, 1989, at 1. 
203. See Andrew Rosenthal, No More Panamas, Bush Aides Predict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
1990, at A9 (estimate of 400 deaths by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, esti-
mate of a minimum of 1000 deaths by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark); David E. Pitt, 
The Invasion's Civilian Toll: Still No Official Count, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1990, at A9; Panama 
sumida en el caos y Noriega continua pr6fugo, LA PRENSA (Buenos Aires), Dec. 23, 1989, at 1 
(representative of overthrown Panama government estimated 6000 to 7000 killed); Acusan a 
EE. UU. de esconder una matanza, LA PRENSA (Buenos Aires), Dec. 26, 1989, at 2 (Red Cross 
representative says "at least two thousand killed; the morgues of the hospitals are overflowing 
and there is no more room"); J. D. Gannon, Invasion Took Its Toll in Deaths, Human Suffer-
ing, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 29, 1989, at 3 (estimate of 1000 civilians killed). 
204. See Brook Larmer, In Invasion's Wake, Disorder Reigns in Panamanian Capital, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 22, 1989, at 1 (over 1000 wounded); us Military Inter-
vention in Panama, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, Bulletin (No. 169), Feb. 1990, at 2 (hospitals in 
Panama City "inundated with civilian and military casualties," "[o]ver 800 people were 
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pitious from the standpoint of the rule of law in the world commu-
nity. As the state most capable of bringing armed force to bear 
against others, the United States has a special responsibility to abide 
by the agreed rules. There is little hope for the rule of law if the 
United States does not accept international strictures. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If a new world order is to emerge, it must be based on an adher-
ence to legality by the United States, a principal player in that new 
order. The United States' recent record, however, gives little cause 
for optimism about its willingness to abide by international norms in 
its dealings with other states, particularly in regard to the Third 
World. As before, the United States enjoys a preponderance in eco-
nomic clout and military force and has shown itself reluctant to re-
frain from using them when it is to their advantage. 
Regrettably, the recent international practice of the United 
States has reflected a disregard for multilateral process and interna-
tional law. One analyst said, "in a variety of unilateral maneuvers, 
such as the withdrawal from UNESCO, the operations in Grenada, 
the closure of the PLO liaison office at the United Nations, and the 
failure to pay full U.N. dues, the United States has largely isolated 
itself from world public and legal opinion. "20s That assessment is, 
unfortunately, accurate. The Persian Gulf actions of 1990-91 have 
further isolated the United States from public opinion in that region. 
The rationale for eschewing multilateral approaches was, suppos-
edly, to promote the United States' national interests. However, a 
lawful foreign policy better serves national interests, because it can 
ensure the mutual respect necessary to inter-state cooperation. 206 
"The costs of continuing on a separatist course are various, ranging 
from its direct effect on foreign opinion, to its effect on the overall 
systemic consideration of the value of strengthening the rule of law 
internationally by allowing for judicial resolution of disputes."207 
Only in a law-abiding world community can states and individuals be 
protected and work together to solve vital international problems. 
treated during the first few days," "medicines and medical material were in short supply," 
l.C.R.C. brought in two planeloads of medical supplies to make up the shortfall). 
205. Detlev Vagts, Going to Court, Internationally, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1712, 1717 (1989) 
(reviewing THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lori Fisler 
Damrosch ed., 1987)). 
206. Bums H. Weston, The Reagan Administration Versus International Law, 19 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 295, 298 - 300 (1987). 
207. Vagts, supra note 205, at 1717. 
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And only a law-abiding state has a moral base from which to call 
other states to account when they violate international law. 
If the United States continues to use military force on legally 
dubious grounds, it is unlikely that the world will be, in President 
Bush's words, "freer from the threat of terror." To the extent that the 
United States is perceived as using force inappropriately, those who 
sympathize with the objects of that force will be encouraged to resort 
to terrorism, because it provides an available, even if ineffective 
response. 
If the world is to be, in President Bush's words, "stronger in the 
pursuit of justice," the United States must change its attitude towards 
international adjudication and must not use military force in ways 
that violate the rights of other states and peoples. 
If, in President Bush's words, the world is to be "more secure in 
the quest for peace," the United States must pursue non-forceful 
mechanisms more diligently. 
Other states besides the United States, to be sure, must adhere to 
the rule of law if it is to succeed at the universal level. The United 
States cannot pursue a rule of law approach if others do not. How-
ever, the record of recent years is that the United States has been one 
of the more frequent lawbreakers. As a powerful state, the signifi-
cance of that lawbreaking is magnified. If the United States as the 
state with the greatest military potential is not committed to the rule 
of law, prospects for its achievement are dim. The end of the cold war 
has opened the prospect for a higher level of law-adherence in world 
community relations.208 That opportunity must be seized. 
For most of this century, unfortunately, the United States has 
shown itself willing to pursue economic and political interests in ways 
that violate the rights of other states. That is the background to the 
practices recounted above. The United States developed a pattern of 
military intervention in Latin America early in the century, when 
President Theodore Roosevelt claimed a right to intervene in coun-
tries that defaulted on their public debt. 209 After World War II the 
pattern was extended to the rest of the Third World. The cold war 
provided a new impetus and rationale for intervention. 
The creation of the United Nations, the Organization of Ameri-
208. John Quigley, Law for a World Community, 16 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1 
(1989). 
209. Protocol Providing for the Collection and Disbursement of the Dominican Repub-
lic's Customs Revenues by the U.S., February 7, 1905, FOR. RELS. U.S. 1905 at 334 (Feb. 15, 
1905). 
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can States, and other organizations, held a hope of curbing unilateral 
intervention. But if the rule of law at the universal level is to prevail, 
the United States must commit itself to follow multilateral processes. 
The Bush Administration, in comparison with the Reagan Adminis-
tration, has made minor steps towards more harmonious inter-action 
with other states. It has begun to pay arrears to the United Nations. 
It is not operating on the prior cold war assumptions. However, it 
has created its own ideology that suggests a need to use military force 
to maintain dominance abroad. It has not distanced itself from the 
Reagan Administration's disregard of legality in the use of force. It 
has unlawfully used military force itself. It has not re-joined 
UNESCO. 
The concept of a new order in which states interact harmoni-
ously is a laudable ideal. All states should work to achieve this kind 
of world. Before it can gain a following on its initiative, however, the 
United States must demonstrate its willingness to comply with inter-
national norms more fully. 
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